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ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW

Heather Owen*

I.

INTRODUCTION

1
The state of California is often deemed "progressive."
While this is true for many issues, the same cannot be said for
all. For example, the legal issues facing California's low-income
population are not adequately addressed.2 In fact, the needs of
California's poor are becoming more complex while the number
of poor people in California is rising, 3 creating a bleak situation
in need of attention. The state of California's poor may not be
attractive; however, the State Bar of California Standing
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct issued
three formal opinions involving pertinent ethical and
professional responsibility issues in 2002.4 While California
grappled with its own issues over the past year, the American
Bar Association (ABA) completed its revision of the Model Rules
whether
of Professional Conduct. 5 It remains to be seen
6
ABA.
the
by
made
California will adopt the revisions
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Matthew J. Madalo, Note, Ethics Year in Review, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV.

1291, 1291 (2002).
2.

See generally CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, THE PATH TO EQUAL

JUSTICE: A FIVE-YEAR STATUS REPORT ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA (2002).
3. See id. at 7.

4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.
6.
The recently appointed Commission for the Revision of the Rules of
Professional Conduct will soon decide whether California should pattern
its Rules of Professional Conduct after the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct [the Model Rules], or whether California should
continue to go its own way with a unique set of professional responsibility
rules.
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This article addresses the ethical developments in California
and across the nation over the past year. Part II discusses the
state of California's low-income population and its access to
justice within the state. 7 Part III summarizes the formal ethics
opinions issued by the State Bar of California Standing
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct in 2002.8
Part IV addresses and highlights the ABA's revision of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 9
II.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA

The goal of the California Commission on Access to Justice
(Commission) is to coordinate and advance efforts to ensure
access to civil justice. 10 In October 2002, the Commission
released a five-year status report entitled The Path to Equal
Justice." The report recognized the bleak reality that "[flew who
need legal help [actually] get it."12 While California made some
modest attempts at improving access to legal services for the
poor, numerous shortcomings cannot be ignored. 13
The
Commission specifically calls upon the legal profession, among
others, to help improve California's justice system and the access
afforded California's underprivileged.14
The legal profession must respond to ensure the legal rights

http://www.calbar.ca.gov/calbar/2cbj/02may/page8-l.htm.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.

9. See infra Part IV.
10.

See CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2.

11. See id. The State Bar created the Commission in 1997. The Commission is
made up of members appointed by the Governor, the Attorney General, the
President Pro Tem of the Senate, the Speaker of the Assembly, the Chief Justice, the
State Bar and statewide business, labor, religious, and civic organizations. The goal
of the Commission is to "coordinate and advance efforts to ensure equal access to
civil justice." Id. at 18. In its first five years, the Commission has made
[S]ubstantial inroads in several priority areas, including: securing $10
million in annual state funding for legal services programs beginning in
1999; facilitating bench-bar collaboration; serving as a resource for the
judiciary, state lawmakers and other civic leaders on access issues;
utilizing new technologies to improve legal services; and addressing ways
to eliminate language barriers in the judicial system.

Id.
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http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar-cbj.jsp?sCategortyPath=/Home/A
ttorney%20 (last visited Dec. 21, 2002).
13. See id.
14. See CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 3-4.
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of California's poor are properly addressed.' 5 Specifically, the
Commission stresses the importance of breaking down the
barriers obstructing the poor's access to "employment, housing,
health care and transportation while monitoring how state and
federal policies affect those who lack the resources to assert their
own rights and move toward self-sufficiency." 16
The
Commission characterizes as "critical" the need for legal aid
advocates assistance to low-income individuals. 17 Legal aid
advocates tackle a variety of issues facing low-income
Californians. 18 These issues range from ensuring educational
opportunities for children, working to provide safe and
affordable housing, assisting victims of domestic violence,
attending to the legal requests of immigrants, to aiding with
employment-related matters. 19 Given that the resources are
inadequate-the ratio of poor people to legal aid attorneys in
California is 10,000 to 1-the success stories of legal aid
advocates are commendable. 20 To illustrate, consider the plight
of a domestic violence victim who sought enforcement of
spousal and child support and needed the assistance of legal
advocates:
Although she had been married 19 years and had obtained a
dissolution, the woman's ex-husband claimed they were
never married. Legal services helped her assemble the
necessary papers, and she successfully represented herself in
21
court, where both orders were upheld.
The legal issues facing California's poor vary in nature and
complexity, however, none can be ignored. The legal profession
must step to the plate and make a difference in the life of
California's low-income population.
While cries to the legal profession for assistance with the
legal needs of California's poor may sometimes appear to go
unnoticed, giving California's legal community a bad rap, the
criticism is not entirely warranted. 22 "Given the high debt
burden that accompanies professional education for most law
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id. at 8.
Id. at 8.
See id.
See id. at 11.
See id. at 12-14.
20. See CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 14.
21. Id. at 12.
22. See generally MARTHA R. MAHONEY, JOHN 0. CALMORE, &

STEPHANIE M.

WILDMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW (2002).
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graduates, debates continue about how to facilitate entry into
social justice legal work, which is usually low-paying in relation
to corporate practice." 23 While it is difficult to truly understand
how debt factors into a law graduate's decision making process
in terms of selecting an occupation, one cannot ignore the
income disparity between public interest jobs and private
practice jobs.24 Given the fact the majority of law graduates
incur some debt throughout their legal education, the fact that
private practice jobs pay substantially more money than public
interest jobs, and the fact that the majority of legal issues facing
California's poor will not be handled within private practice law
firms, it is not difficult to understand the lack of access to justice
experienced by California's poor. 25 While these facts may
explain why California's poor are not afforded adequate access
to justice, they do not make the situation any more tolerable.
A.

The ChangingNeeds of California'sLower-Income Families26

Although the past five years witnessed many improvements
made to the California justice system, 27 the state of California's
poor remains bleak and much remains to be done. From 19902000, the number of people in poverty in the United States
increased by 1,955,826, while the number of people in poverty in
California alone increased by 1,078,545.28 Of those who fell into
poverty in California, 478,627, or 24.5% of the total poverty
increase in the United States, reside in Los Angeles County. 29
The legal issues of low-income people have become more
extensive and complicated over the past five years.30 While the
late 1990s were a time of vast economic growth for many in
23. Id. at 25. In 1999, the average debt of private law school graduates was
$56,324.

See id. citing Phillip G. Schrag, The Federal Income-Contingent Repayment

Option for Law Student Loans, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 742, 746-47 (2001).
24. See MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 22, at 26. In 1999, large private law firms
(more than 250 lawyers) paid $90,000, while legal service positions paid from
$22,500-$38,000 and public interest jobs ranged in pay from $25,000-$48,000. See id.
citing NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LAW PLACEMENT, JOBS AND J.D.s, EMPLOYMENT
AND SALARIES OF NEW LAW GRADUATES, CLASS OF 1998 29,39 (1999).
25. See generally MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 22.
26. CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 7.

27. The Commission highlights four areas of improvement within California: 1)
establishment of the Access Commission; 2) improved state funding; 3) improved
judicial leadership; and 4) development of a more innovative state planning
approach. See CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 1-2.
28. See id. at 7.

29. See id.
30. See id.
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California, California's poor did not benefit from the boom.
Instead, the gap between the poor and the rest of California
noticeably widened. 31
During the 1990s, the number of
Californians seeking assistance from the legal aid system
increased dramatically due to a 30% increase in the number of
people living in poverty. 32 The explanation for the chasm
between the rich and the poor and the increase in poverty is
twofold: "[h]igh-tech doesn't create a vast array of well-paying
factory jobs, and it puts a premium on an educated work force.
And California, more than other states, has a high concentration
of uneducated immigrant workers." 33
B.

Findingsand Recommendations

The Commission created a set of findings and
recommendations to guide California's "effort to provide access
to justice to all Californians." 34
The Commission's
recommendations are "[r]ooted in the understanding that access
to justice is a governmental responsibility and a community
obligation," and "emphasize the need for increased funding and
participation from civic and business leaders in the equal justice
effort." 35 The nine recommendations for California, as outlined
36
by the Commission, are discussed below.
First, the Commission recommends that California's
government should have an affirmative duty to supply access to
justice for all Californians.3 7 A governments' legal obligation to
provide low-income populations access to the legal system has
been recognized for many years in a "majority of Europe's
western democracies and Canada's provinces." 38 California
needs to catch up and implement a system in which "right[s] to
representation in cases involving basic human needs such as
housing, food, health care, employment, education, safety, child
custody and public assistance" are government funded. 39 The
problem of inadequate legal services is a problem not relegated
to an individual matter, but rather a concern for all of us in
31. See id. at 8.
32. See CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 8.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. note 4 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 35.
Id.
See id. at 36-39.
See id. at 40.
CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at
Id.

40.
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society, lawyers and non-lawyers alike.
"California law
should.., expressly recognize that government has an
obligation to ensure all Californians meaningful access to quality
justice when they need it."40
Next, the Commission highlights the need for increased
funding for legal aid to ensure that suitable representation can
be afforded in cases relating to basic human needs. 41 Funding
from private and public sources must increase to guarantee
access to legal representation for all, irrespective of income. 42
The Commission states that "[d]uring the next five years, the
Equal Access Fund ["Fund"] must be dramatically enhanced,
and total resources for legal services for the poor should be
increased so as to fill 50 percent of the legal needs of the poor." 43
With the help of private and public sources, the Fund can be
substantiated to provide for future generations. 44 In addition,
the legal services provided must be accessible to all because
"[m]any of the services that are available are unusable by those
who need help most: uneducated litigants with limited
45
competence and English language skills."

Next, the Commission stresses the importance of
maintaining its leadership role in the struggle to provide legal
access to all Californians. 46
Providing access to legal
representation for all Californians is by no means an easy task,
nor should it be shouldered by any single organization or
individual. 47 Rather, because the problem is one that impacts
Californians collectively, the solution must also be a collective
one. With the Commission's vision of reaching the goals of
delivering legal services to the poor, attorneys must find
imperative the need to volunteer their time and assistance to
legal aid. With the Commission taking the lead, all Californians
should follow. 48
The Commission specifically calls upon attorneys to be key
contributors and leaders in the movement to provide legal
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.

44. See CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 40.
45. MAHONEY, E7 AL., supra note 22, at 67 (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Access to
Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001)).
46. See CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 40

47. See id.
48. See id.
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representation to all Californians. 49

1.507

Attorneys must take a

personal interest in the communities they serve as officers of the
court and not accept the fact that "pro bono service occupies less
than 1% of lawyers' working hours."50 While attorneys cannot
solve the "crisis in access to justice" single-handedly "given their
unique role within the legal system and their capabilities as
contributors and volunteers, attorneys must be leaders in the
access to justice effort."5 ' The Commission must also continue
working with the State Bar, the judiciary, and the legal
profession to "encourage expanded pro bono service within the
legal profession." 52 In addition, the Commission should
encourage greater financial support, volunteered time, and
services from the State Bar, the judiciary, and the legal
profession.5 3 "Law schools [also] have a unique opportunity and
a corresponding obligation to insure that issues concerning
access to legal services occupy a central place in their curricula,
and that pro bono activity plays a central role in their students'
educational experience." 54
Coordinated efforts must continue to ensure provision of
legal services to low-income populations regionally and
statewide.5 5 The Commission states that "[s ]uch coordination is
necessary to avoid unacceptable gaps in services across the state,
particularly with regard to immigrant families and rural
areas."5 6 The Commission recognized four important areas to
target: (1) focus on addressing the legal service needs of rural
communities and implement programs to effectuate such
change; (2) employ technological advances to facilitate and
improve legal services; (3) create or find alternative mechanisms
that are efficient in the delivery of legal services; and (4) locate
and build partnerships with other enterprises and law firms and
continue to leverage existing resources to provide to legal aid in
order to maximize the effectiveness and quality of services

49. See id. at 41.
50. MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 22, at 69 (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Access to
Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001)).

51. CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 41.

52. Id. at 40.
53. See id. at 40-41.
54. MAHONEY, ET AL., supra note 22, at 70 (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Access to
Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001)).

55. See CAL. COMM'N ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 40-41.
56. Id at 41.
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delivered.5 7
Next, the Commission focuses on its desire to see the
implementation of "innovative methods for delivery of low-cost
legal services" to assist those of modest means.5 8 The cost of
living in California precludes many people from affording legal
services.5 9 "Programs to assist these individuals in accessing
low-cost legal assistance must be a component of any effort to
achieve equal access to justice." 60 The Commission notes the
correlation between addressing the need to provide low-cost
legal representation to low-income individuals and the advances
61
that automatically follow in supplying equal access to the poor.
The Commission highlights three suggestions under this
particular recommendation: "Explore innovative methods for
delivering low-cost legal services; [e]xpand use of
paraprofessionals in cases that do no require a lawyer's
expertise; and [e]xpand availability of limited-scope legal
assistance." 62
Another recognized problem is the inaccessibility of our
judicial system for California's lower-income population.63 To
expand the accessibility of the courts, California's courts must
focus on the community in which they operate and respond to
the community's needs. 64 "Self-help centers and Web sites,
judicial training on access to justice issues and efforts to remove
language barriers should continue to be priorities." 65 The
Commission suggests four points of focus under this
recommendation: "Build on expanded self-help programs to
provide [a] full spectrum of services"; "[c]ontinue to improve
small claims courts"; "[e]xpand efforts to provide assistance for
litigants with limited English proficiency"; and "[c]ontinue to
66
develop ways to simplify the law and evaluate progress."
Given the diversity of our state, with its inhabitants speaking a
multiplicity of languages as broad and varied as anywhere in the
world, the needs of poor immigrants, particularly indigents of
57. See id.
58. Id. at 42.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id.
Id.
See CAL. COMM'N
Id.
See id. at 42.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 43.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE,

supra note 2, at 40-41.
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color, would benefit greatly from any attempt to bridge the
language and cultural divide in our justice system.
The Commission next emphasizes the need to educate the
public on the issues surrounding access to justice. 67 A welleducated general public can "contribute to the development of
sound public policy in this area of governmental
responsibility." 68 While the Judicial Council and the State Bar
have progressed "in educating the general public about their
legal rights, how courts function and the legal system in
general,... public opinion surveys reveal a woeful lack of
knowledge and numerous misconceptions about the status of
equal justice in California." 69 In response, the Commission is
making a concerted effort to educate the public about the
problems of the delivery of justice. 70 With the high number of
attorneys in California, it is unfortunate that the requirements of
those most in need are far from adequately met.
The Commission next notes that evaluation tools used to
assess "ongoing and experimental service delivery approaches"
must take a high priority. 71 "All resources must be directed to
the best possible use, and triage needs to be part of the mixed
delivery system so that a person's legal need is met with the
72
most appropriate delivery system."
C.

Conclusion

As society continues to evolve and becomes increasingly
pluralistic in terms of demographics, legal issues facing
California's poor will constantly change and, in turn, demand on
the attorneys who must be fluent in the ways they practice law,
to best zealously serve their clients, members of our society most
in need of legal aid. The direct and indirect benefits that are
conferred upon the citizens of our state, and California as a
whole cannot be hindered by attorneys unwilling to take up the
cause of the poor, and perpetuate further feelings of alienation
about society's low-income sector. Resources from all possible
avenues must not be closed to the detriment to all. As the
Commission reminds us, the role of attorneys in assisting
67. See CAL. COMM'N ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 44.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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California's poor is a great one that must be taken seriously in
order to better the state of California.
III. FORMAL OPINIONS OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
CONDUCT

In 2002, the State Bar of California Standing Committee on
Professional Responsibility and Conduct (Committee) issued
three formal opinions, albeit non-binding advisory opinions,
regarding concerns involving ethics and professional
responsibility submitted by the Board of Governors, individual
attorneys, and local bar associations.
A.

Avoid Ethical Issues Arising Out of the Representationof
Multiple Criminal Defendants: Formal Opinion 2002-15873

In Formal Opinion 2002-158, the Committee addressed the
creation of a physically separate "firm" within a public office so
as to avoid potential conflicts of interest arising from the
representation of multiple defendants. 74 Such conflicts are
prohibited by Rules 3-110 and 3-310 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct of the State Bar of California (Rules). 75 The Committee
73. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm.on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct,
Formal Op. 2002-158 (2002) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2002-158].
74. See id.
75. See id. Rule 3-110 states:
(A) A member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to
perform legal services with competence.
(B) For purposes of this rule, "competence" in any legal service shall mean
to apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill, and 3) mental, emotional,
and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance of such
service.
(C) If a member does not have sufficient learning and skill when the legal
service is undertaken the member may nonetheless perform such services
competently by 1) associating with or where appropriate, professionally
consulting another lawyer reasonably believed to be competent, or 2) by
acquiring sufficient learning and skill before performance is required.
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-110 (2002). Rule 3-310 states:

(A) For purposes of this rule:
(1) "Disclosure" means informing the client or former client of the
relevant circumstances of the actual and reasonably foreseeable
adverse consequences to the client or former client;
(2) "Informed written consent" means the client's or former client's
written agreement to representation following written disclosure;
(3) "Written" means any writing as defined in Evidence Code section
250.
(B) A member shall not accept or continue representation of a client

2003]
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concluded that by creating "a physically separate 'firm' within a
public office charged with indigent criminal defense, so that
different 'firms' represent different defendants," conflicts
created by the representation of numerous defendants can be
avoided. 76 However, the Committee noted that such conflicts
without providing written disclosure to the client where:
(1) The member has a legal, business, financial, professional, or
personal relationship with a party or witness in the same matter; or
(2) The member knows or reasonably should know that:
(a) the member previously had a legal, business, financial,
professional, or personal relationship with a party or witness in
the same matter; and
(b) the previous relationship would substantially affect the
member's representation; or
(3) The member has or had a legal, business, financial, professional, or
personal relationship with another person or entity the member
knows or reasonably should know would be affected substantially by
resolution of the matter or
(4) The member has or had a legal, business, financial, or professional
interest in the subject matter of the representation.
(C) A member shall not, without the informed written consent of each
client:
(1) Accept representation of more than one client in a matter in which
the interest of the clients potentially conflict; or
(2) Accept or continue representation of more than one client in a
matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; or
(3) Represent a client in a matter and at the same time in a separate
matter accept as client a person or entity whose interest in the first
matter is adverse to the client in the first matter.
(D) A member who represents two or more clients shall not enter into an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients without the
informed written consent of each client.
(E) A member shall not, without the informed written consent of the client
or former client, accept employment adverse to the client or former client
where, by reason of the representation of the client or former client, the
member has obtained confidential information material to the
employment.
(F) A member shall not accept compensation for representing a client from
one other than the client unless:
(1) There is no interference with the member's independence of
professional judgment or the client-lawyer relationship; and
(2) Information relating to representation of the client is protected as
required by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision
(e); and
(3) The member obtains the client's informed written consent,
provided that no disclosure or consent is required if;
(a) such nondisclosure is otherwise authorized by law, or
(b) the member is rendering legal services on behalf of any public
agency which provides legal services to other public agencies or
the public.
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310 (2002).

76. Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73.
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can be avoided "only with adequate safeguards including
maintaining the separateness of the two 'firms."' 77
The Committee examined People v. Christian, 41 Cal. App.
4th 986 (1996), in detail in reaching its conclusion. 78 In Christian,
the Contra Costa County Public Defender's (PD) office
established a distinct unit within its office and designated it the
Alternative Defender Office (ADO).79 Even though the ADO is
housed in the PD's office, it conducts its everyday business
autonomously from the rest of the PD office and maintains
effective safeguards to ensure that attorney-client discussions
remain confidential.80 Given the precautions taken by the
Contra Costa County PD's office, the California court of appeals
upheld the representation of two co-defendants by the PD's
office and the ADO.81 The court allowed this representation to
withstand the objection of one of the defendants, even without
the consent from either defendant.8 2 The court held that "the PD
and the ADO are separate firms for purposes of conflict
analysis."8 3
Hence, traditional conflict analysis may be
employed to analyze the potential ethical issues arising from the
division of a public defender's office into two offices.8 4
The Conmittee addressed the need for further analysis
beyond the use of traditional conflict analysis caused by the
unique circumstances surrounding the divide within the PD's
office.85 The remainder of the opinion was devoted to five
distinct situations that warrant further analysis, and which are
discussed below in turn.8 6

77. Id.
78. See id.

79. People v. Christian, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (1996).
80. See Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73. For instance, the ADO office is only
accessible by ADO employees, the files of each respective unit are housed
separately, the ADO employs its own file numbers for its cases, and the ADO uses
its own communications network. See id.
81. See Christian,41 Cal. App. 4th at 1000.
82. See id.
83. Christian, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1000.
84. The Committee characterizes traditional conflict analysis as the analysis
"used when separate private law firms are involved." Formal Op. 2002-158, supra
note 73.
85. See id.
86. See id. The Committee notes that the five situations addressed in the
opinion are not intended to be exhaustive. See id.

ETHICS YEAR IN REVIEW

2003]

1513

1. Repeat Offenses
The Committee analyzed the following hypothetical: A and
B were prosecuted as co-defendants; A was represented by
private counsel; B was represented by the PD; the PD
successfully transferred blame to A.87 A was convicted; B was
acquitted; later, A, who became indigent, was involved in a new
unrelated criminal matter. 88 The question of concern to the
Committee was whether the PD should represent A over A's
89
objection.
The Committee stated that ultimate resolution of the issue is
for the court to decide, but provided guidelines for the PD to
consider when handling such a matter in conducting a conflict
check. 90 According to the Committee, the PD should consider
whether it can preserve A's confidences. 91 The PD should also
determine, given the circumstances, whether it should
recommend to the court that the ADO, instead of the PD, be
selected counsel for A.92 The result of this structure is that the
existence of an ADO within a PD's office may make a court more
willing to appoint public counsel, as opposed to private counsel,
93
for indigent defendants in similar situations.
2. Representationof One of Two Co-defendants by the PD
Another situation of possible conflict of interest may arise
when one co-defendant is represented by the PD herself and the
94
other co-defendant is represented by an attorney in the ADO.
The apparent conflict of interest stems from the potential
95 For
promotional opportunities for the attorney in the ADO.
example, under the measures in the Christian case, promotions
for ADO attorneys are administered by the PD, although the
initial promotional recommendation is made by the ADO

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73.
See id, citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (2002). Section 6068(e) states:

It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following:
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or

herself to preserve the secrets, of his or her client.
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e).

92. See Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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supervising attorney.96 Therefore, there is a question as to
whether the ADO attorney can adequately represent her client,
the co-defendant, when her boss, the PD, represents the other
co-defendant. 97 For instance, the ADO attorney may be
"concerned that the outcome of the criminal proceedings might
substantially affect her financial or promotional interests in the
office." 98 In other words, the system of division between the
PD's office and the particular ADO may be a legal fiction for the
purposes of arguing that a conflict of interest does not exist.
Rule 3-310(B)(4) mandates a "member to make written
disclosure to a client when the member has or had a legal,
business, financial, or professional interest in the subject matter
of the representation." 99 It follows then that the partitioning of
the PD's office is far from being immune from the possibility of
attorneys in the same office sharing information with one
another regarding any given caseload. The California Supreme
Court stated, "[t]he primary purpose of this prophylactic rule is
to prevent situations in which an attorney might compromise his
or her representation of the client in order to advance the
attorney's own financial or personal interests." 100
The
Committee, therefore, recommends that ADO attorneys be
aware of this type of conflict and the application of Rule 3310(B)(4) prior to agreeing to or carrying on any
representation.'01 If a conflict of interest under Rule 3-310(B)(4)
develops, the ADO attorney must make a written disclosure of
"the relevant circumstances and of the actual and reasonably
foreseeable adverse consequences to the client." 102
3. Transfer of PersonnelBetween the PD and the ADO
Deputy attorneys transferring from the PD's office to do
work at the ADO and from the ADO back to the PD's office
96. See People v. Christian, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 986 (1996).
97. See Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73.
98. Id.
99. Id. Rule 3-310(B)(4) states: "(B) A member shall not accept or continue
representation of a client without providing written disclosure to the client where:
(4) The member has or had a legal, business, financial, or professional interest in the
subject matter of the representation." CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3310(B)(4) (2002).
100. Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys Ass'n. v. Woodside, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d
617 (1994).
101. See Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73.
102. CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(A)(1).
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create another potential conflict of interest. 10 3 One of the main
concerns is the possibility of a deputy transferring from the PD's
office to the ADO, having acquired confidential information
1°4 This
from the PD that would benefit a client of the ADO.
information may be adverse to the client, yet get back to the
10 5
other attorney on the case.
A possible solution to this conflict is for the receiving office
not to accept a client whose case evokes relevant confidential
information from a transferring attorney. This solution offers
protection for any potential client.10 6 Another possible solution
is to set up an ethical screen. 10 7 The ethical screen would shield
the transferring attorney in possession of the relevant
confidential information from other attorneys in the office who
could potentially benefit from the relevant confidential
information. 108 The court of appeals in Henriksen v. Great
American Savings & Loan, 11 Cal.App.4th 109, 116 (1992),
articulated the usual elements of an ethical wall: "physical,
geographic, and departmental separation of attorneys;
prohibitions against and sanctions for discussing confidential
matters; established rules and procedures preventing access to
confidential information and files; procedures preventing a
disqualified attorney from sharing in the profits from the
representation; and continuing education in professional
responsibility."1 09
4. Supervision and Promotion of ADO Personnel
The PD, within a particular PD's office, may be responsible
for overseeing the work of subordinate attorneys, including

103. Deputies may transfer for a number of reasons, including the changing
needs of one branch or for reasons relating to promotional opportunities in one
branch over the other. See Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73.
104. See id.

105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. See e.g., Chadwick v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1980).
Similar problems may arise with the transfer of non-attorney support staff from one
office to another. In such situations, both the transferring and receiving offices
should instruct the transferring non-attorney support staff that it possesses
confidential information and a sufficient ethics screen should be constructed by the
receiving office. See Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73.

109. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct,
Formal Op. 2002-158 (2002) (citing Henriksen v. Great Am. Savings & Loan, 11
Cal.App.4th 109, 116 n.6 (1992)).
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ADO attorneys. 110 The Committee addressed this issue through
the following example: "an issue relating to the imposition of
office discipline could arise out of the representation of a client
by an ADO deputy. In such circumstances the [PD] may want to
review the ADO office file relating to that representation.""'
The Committee's response to the issue of supervision and
promotion of ADO personnel implicates the imposition of
limitations consistent with section 6068(e) of the Business and

Professions Code (B & P Code) and Rule

3-110.112

The PD has

more freedom accessing confidential client information in her
own office than in the ADO.113 However, Rule 3-110 requires the
PD to maintain the competence of ADO attorneys, while section
6068(e) of the B & P Code precludes the PD from total access to
the necessary records to ensure the competence of ADO
attorneys." 4 Thus, the PD must uphold the duty under Rule 3110, while not violating her ethical obligations under section
6068(e) of the B & P Code. 115
5. FinancialConsiderations
Ethical dilemmas may develop in situations in which one
person, the PD, manages the money of two offices-the Public
Defender's office and the ADO16 The PD has a duty to provide
zealous 17 and competent'18 representation to all clients." 9
However, the PD can easily compromise his duty when he
controls the finances of the PD's office and the ADO. For
example, "where the [PD] is responsible for the budgets of both
offices and the assignment of personnel to them, the [PD] must
take care not to discriminate.., against [or show bias in favor
of] one client or class of clients in assigning work or providing
110. See Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73; see also supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
111. Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73.
112. See id. See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e); CAL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3-110.
113. See Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73. Confidential client information may
not be disclosed to someone outside the "firm." Therefore, the Public Defender
may not access confidential client information in the ADO because the Public
Defender is not a member of the ADO "firm." See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. (citing People v. McKenzie, 194 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1983)).
118. See Formal Op. 2002-158, supra note 73.
119. Id.
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investigation, testing, or other resources." 120 The Committee
concludes its discussion of this situation by stating, "avoiding
this problem by not providing the services to either client might
also violate the duty to provide competent representation to
121
both clients."
6.

Conclusion

The Committee closes Formal Opinion 2002-158 by
reiterating that dividing a PD's office into two distinct offices
does not violate any laws. However, the Committee again notes
that this separation raises ethical issues, from financial and
many other practical fronts, which must be addressed with
sufficient safeguards. 122 "With the passage of time and as the
use of such bifurcated offices under the auspices of the same
[PD] becomes more prevalent because of the need for fiscal
economy," 123 the ethical issues raised in this opinion will
undoubtedly become more widespread, thus highlighting the
importance of the issues raised in this opinion.
The Ethical Permissibilityof a Lawyer Employing a Specified
Escrow Arrangement to Fund Legal Representation:Formal
Opinion 2002-159124
In Formal Opinion 2002-159, the Committee analyzed a
particular set of facts dealing with a proposed escrow
arrangement between an attorney and client. Specifically, the
Committee examined the ethical permissibility of a lawyer:
(1) tell[ing] a potential client of the possibility of financing
the legal representation by taking out a mortgage loan on the
client's real property and (2) refer[ring] the client to an
independent broker who might arrange the financing, where
the resulting loan funds are placed in an escrow account
which is not controlled by the lawyer and from which the
funds are disbursed to the lawyer for fees and costs for work
performed on behalf of the client[.] 125
The Committee determined the applicability of specific

B.

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm.on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct,
Formal Op. 2002-159 (2002) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2002-159].
125. Id.
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authorities to the proposed escrow arrangement and highlighted
concerns of which attorneys should be aware based on the
following hypothetical set of facts.
1.

Hypothetical Statement of Facts

A potential client contacts Attorney A seeking her
services. 126 The potential client is currently unable to pay for
Attorney A's services, but "owns real estate which can be
encumbered as security for a loan, the proceeds of which could
be used to pay for legal services." 127 Attorney A refers the
potential client to a licensed broker who may be able to set up a
loan to finance Attorney A's services. 128 Attorney A states in
writing that she is neither "advising the potential client
concerning
alternative
methods
for
financing
legal
representation nor recommending the use of the particular
broker." 129 In addition, Attorney A is not compensated with
respect to the referral, the loan, or the escrow and Attorney A's
representation is not conditioned upon the potential client using
the recommended broker for the financing 30 Attorney A
collects her costs and fees by sending "statements each billing
cycle to the escrow account" requesting payment of funds for
her compensation.' 31 Attorney A mails a copy of the bill to the
client and the client is given a reasonable amount of time to
contest the bill.132 If the client does not object, "the funds then
are released for payment of legal services according to the fee
agreement between the attorney and the client." 133
2. Discussion
The Committee divides its discussion into three subsections.

126. See id.

127. Id.
128. See id.

129. Id. The facts further state:
The lawyer further states in writing that she does not represent the broker,
the lender, or the prospective client in the loan transaction, and that she
does not represent any of them or the escrow company with regard to the
escrow in which the lender and the prospective client agree to place the
loan proceeds.
Id.
130. See Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124.

131. Id.
132. See id.

133. Id.
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a. The Proposed Escrow Arrangement Does not Require
Compliance with Rule 3-300
Rule 3-300 controls an attorney's business transactions with
a client.1 34 The rule "prohibits a lawyer from entering into a
business transaction with her client, and from knowingly
acquiring an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary
interest adverse to her client, unless she first complies with the
requirements set out in the rule." 135 The referral and escrow
arrangement established in the hypothetical does not amount to
an impermissible business transaction under Rule 3-300.136
Attorney A' and the client did not enter into a business
transaction. 37 Attorney A "is not a direct or indirect party to the
loan, [because] the broker is independent of the lawyer, and the
lawyer does not benefit from the loan transaction."138 The
Committee highlights that Attorney A did not receive a financial
benefit from the referral and escrow arrangement, thus making
the arrangement permissible under Rule 3-300.139
Further, Attorney A's interest in the escrow account is not a
"pecuniary interest" within the meaning of Rule 3-300.140
Deposit of the loan proceeds in the escrow account does not
create a pecuniary interest for Attorney A because Attorney A
will not earn any of the funds until the completion of legal
134. See id.

135. See id., n.2.
136. See Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124. Rule 3-300 provides:
A member shall not enter into a business transaction with a client; or
knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client, unless each of the following requirements has
been satisfied:
(A) The transaction or acquisition and its terms are fair and reasonable
to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the
client in a manner which should reasonably have been understood by
the client; and
(B) The client is advised in writing that the client may seek the advice
of an independent lawyer of the client's choice and is given a
reasonable opportunity to seek that advice; and
(C) The client thereafter consents in writing to the terms of the
transaction or the terms of the acquisition.
CAL. RuLES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-300 (2002).
137. See Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124.
138. Id.
139. See id. The Committee notes that Attorney A "does receive some benefit
from the escrow arrangement-she is assured that there are funds available to pay
her fees and costs-this is no different from the benefit the lawyer receives by
requiring an advanced fee and placing it in her trust account." See id., n.3.
140. See id.
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services for the client. 141 Moreover, assuming that one were to
consider the loan and escrow arrangement as creating a
pecuniary interest for Attorney A, the arrangement is not
"adverse" under Rule 3-300.142 The California Supreme Court
developed a precise definition of "adverse"-"almost any
financial transaction can be adverse to a client if he or she has to
pay money." 143 Within the meaning of Rule 3-300, a lawyer's
pecuniary interest is 'adverse' to the client, "if the lawyer
acquires the ability to extinguish a client's interest in the
property, without the possibility of judicial intervention,
whether or not the lawyer ever acts to do so." 144
Based on the hypothetical statement of facts and the
California Supreme Court's definition of "adverse," Attorney A
cannot extinguish the client's interest absent judicial
intervention. 145 "The mere deposit of funds in escrow does not
extinguish the client's interest. It is the escrow holder, not the
lawyer, who is in possession of the funds." 146 Attorney A,
therefore, is limited to requesting payment for her services in a
manner consistent with the fee agreement and the escrow. 147
The Committee concludes this subsection by reiterating that
"unless the lawyer has a financial interest in the broker or
receives some form of compensation from the broker for
referring a potential client, rule 3-300 does not apply." 1 48
b. The Proposed Escrow Arrangement Does not Require
Compliance with Rule 4-100
Rule 4-100 deals with the regulation of attorneys'

141. See id.
142. See id.

143. Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124.
144. Id. (citing Connor v. State Bar, 269 Cal. Rptr. 742 (1990), Hawk v. State Bar,
247 Cal. Rptr. 599, In the Matter of Fonte, 2 Cal. Rptr. 752).
145. See Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124.

146. Id.
147. See id. The Committee further notes:
Where the escrow instructions require the lawyer to submit to the client

for the client's review a billing in compliance with Business and
Professions Code section 6148, where the client has an opportunity to
contest the billing, and where the disputed portion of the billing will
remain in escrow or the lawyer's trust account until the dispute is

resolved, there is no violation of rule 3-300 because the lawyer is unable to
extinguish the client's right to control the payment of fees.
Id.

148. Id.
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management of client funds. 149 Rule 4-100(A) provides generally
that any funds received by the attorney for the benefit of the
client must be placed in the attorney's client trust fund
account. 150
Rule 4-100(B) holds attorneys to the careful
requirements of handling client funds. For example, regardless
of whether the client funds are deposited in the attorney's client
trust fund account, the attorney is subject to the rule.' 5 ' The
requirements of Rule 4-100(B) include: "(1) a notice requirement,
(2) a requirement to maintain specified records, and (3) a
152
requirement to render appropriate accounts to a client."
149. See id.
150. See Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124. Rule 4-100(A) provides:
(A) All funds received or held for the benefit of clients by a member or law
firm, including advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one
or more identifiable bank accounts labeled "Trust Account," "Client's
Funds Account" or words of similar import, maintained in the State of
California, or, with written consent of the client, in any other jurisdiction
where there is a substantial relationship between the client or the client's
business and the other jurisdiction. No funds belonging to the member or
the law firm shall be deposited therein or otherwise commingled
therewith except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges.
(2) In the case of funds belonging in part to a client and in part
presently or potentially to the member or the law firm, the portion
belonging to the member or law firm must be withdrawn at the
earliest reasonable time after the member's interest in that portion
becomes fixed. However, when the right of the member or law firm
to receive a portion of trust funds is disputed by the client, the
disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally
resolved.
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-100(A) (2002).

151. See Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124.
152. Id., n.6. Rule 4-100(B) provides:
(B) A member shall:
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of the client's funds,
securities, or other properties.
(2) Identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly
upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of
safekeeping as soon as practicable.
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other
properties of a client coming into the possession of the member or law
firm and render appropriate accounts to the client regarding them;
preserve such records for a period of no less than five years after final
appropriate distribution of such funds or properties; and comply with
any order for an audit of such records issued pursuant to the Rules of
Procedure of the State Bar.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver, as requested by the client, any funds,
securities, or other properties in the possession of the member which
the client is entitled to receive.
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-100(8) (2002).
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In this subsection, the Committee addressed two issues:
first, "whether rule 4-100(A) requires that the loan proceeds be
placed in the lawyer's trust account rather than the escrow
account and second, even if the proposed arrangement does not
activate rule 4-100(A)'s deposit requirement, whether it
nevertheless triggers rule 4-100(B)'s notice, record-keeping, and
1 53
accounting requirements."
The Committee quickly dismissed the Rule 4-100
requirements "because the loan proceeds are never 'received or
held' by the lawyer." 1s 4 To the contrary, the lender deposits the
loan proceeds directly in the escrow account. 5 5 Attorney A may
collect her costs and fees only after she has performed. At this
time, the fees are "fixed and earned." 15 6 Therefore, the fees
belong to Attorney A and should not be placed in Attorney A's
client trust account. 57
c.

The Proposed Escrow Arrangement Does Not Require
Written Disclosure Under Rule 3-310(A)

Rule 3-310 mandates that attorneys disclose to clients in
writing any legal, business, financial, professional, or personal
relationship with a party in the same matter or a business,
financial, or professional interest in the subject matter of the
representation. 5 8 Neither of these provisions, however, control
Attorney A under the hypothetical facts. 159 Rule 3-310(B)(1) does
not apply because Attorney A does not have a relationship,
formal or informal, with the broker. 160 While Attorney A does
refer potential clients to the broker for assistance in financing,
she does not have an obligation to do So.161 Similarly, Rule 3153. Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. Rule 3-310(B) provides in pertinent part:
(B) A member shall not accept or continue representation of a client
without providing written disclosure to the client where:
(1) The member has a legal, business, financial, professional, or
personal relationship with a party or witness to the same matter; or
(4) The member has or had a legal, business, financial, or professional
interest in the subject matter of the representation.
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-310(B) (2002).
159. See Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124.
160. See id.
161. See id. The Committee notes further, "[tihe broker is not a witness or a
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310(B)(4) is inapplicable because Attorney A does not have "an
interest in the client's representation." 162 Nor is Attorney A
to advance
likely to "compromise that representation 'in order
'" 163
interests.
personal
or
the attorney's own financial
The Committee briefly addressed the applicability of Rule 3310(F), "which prohibits a lawyer from accepting 'compensation
for representing a client from one other than the client' unless
certain conditions are met."164 Rule 3-310(F) does not apply to
the hypothetical set of facts because subsection (F) only applies
to situations "where the funds of a third party are being used to
pay the lawyer." 165 The rule is meant to protect the attorney's
duty of undivided loyalty to her client, due to the possibility of
an attorney's duty of loyalty being affected by a third party's
166
interests in paying the attorney's costs and fees.
3. Conclusion
The Committee's analysis illustrates an alternative means of
payment available to clients who are unable to pay their
attorney's costs and fees at a particular point in time, but who
nonetheless own other valuable assets. While the opinion is
limited to the hypothetical set of facts, it raises valuable
considerations for attorneys to consider in their practices.

party to the subject matter of the representation, the lawyer receives no
compensation from the broker for referring potential clients, and the lawyer does
not represent the potential client in the transaction among broker, lender, and
client." Id. The Committee also cautions against unintentionally misleading the
client by stating, "[w]ith respect to this, the lawyer must be careful not to
inadvertently mislead the prospective client into believing the lawyer represents the
client in the identification of financing alternatives, in deciding to use a particular
loan broker, or in the loan or escrow transactions." Id., n.10.
162. Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124.
163. Id. Santa Clara County Counsel Attorneys. Ass'n. v. Woodside, 28 Cal. Rptr.
2d 617, 638 (1994).
164. Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124 (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3-310(F) (2002)).

165. Formal Op. 2002-159, supra note 124.
166. See id. The Committee notes further, "[h]ere, that risk does not appear to
exist where the third party is an escrow agent who does not own the loan proceeds,
but only is responsible for holding and disbursing the client's own funds." Id. The
Committee also warns of the possibility that confidential information may be
disclosed in the billing statements. See id. at n.12.
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The Ethical Constraints Upon an Attorney's Ability to Settle a
Claim and Ability to Collect Legal Fees When Communication
with the Client Is Not Possible: Formal Opinion 2002-160167

In Formal Opinion 2002-160, the Committee addresses the
scope of an attorney's authorized authority with respect to
settlements and the collection of legal fees associated with
authorized settlements when communication with the client is
not possible. 168 More specifically the Committee examines the
"ethical constraints govern[ing] an attorney whose client
has
conferred upon her authority to settle, without instituting
litigation, claims of the client for specific percentages of the
amounts claimed, when the client has disappeared" 169 and the
"ethical constraints govern[ing] the attorney's right to
collect
legal fees from settlement proceeds when communication with
the client is not possible." 170 The Committee employs the
following set of hypothetical facts in its analysis. 171
1.

Statement of Facts

Client retains Attorney A to assist him in the collection of
outstanding medical claims. 72 The written retainer agreement
agreed to by Client and Attorney A "provides for Attorney A to
receive as full payment for her services a contingency fee of 25
percent of each claim collected."' 73 Client authorizes Attorney A
to perform the following functions in writing: "to accept on
Client's behalf settlement offers of two-thirds or more of the
amount sought in any claim, to receive the resulting settlement
proceeds, to endorse Client's name to the settlement check, and
to pay herself from such proceeds the agreed contingency fees
for her legal services." 174 In addition, Client directs Attorney A
"not to institute litigation on any claim without further specific

167. State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm on Prof'l Responsibility and Conduct,
Formal Op. 2002-160 (2002) [hereinafter Formal Op. 2002-160].
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167. The written retainer agreement also
complies with Business and Professions Code section 6147. See id.
174. Id. "To avoid delay in effecting settlement on behalf of Client, Attorney A's
check endorsement authority is contained in an acknowledged power of attorney
from Client." Id.
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authorization from Client." 175
176
Client disappears after Attorney A has been retained.
"Attorney A then receives two offers of settlement of Client's
claims: Attorney B offers to settle several claims for two-thirds of
their face amount; and Attorney C offers to settle another group
of Client's claims for one-half of their face amount." 177
2. Discussion
The Committee presents three questions stemming from the
178
statement of facts, which will be taken in turn below.
a. Must Attorney A Accept Attorney B's Two-thirds Offer
on Behalf of Client?
The Committee initially addressed this issue by articulating
a basic principle: "[a]lthough a client may specifically authorize
the attorney to settle and compromise a claim, the attorney must
bear in mind that she may not accept any proposed settlement
which contains substantive terms at variance with the authority
conferred on her by the client." 179 The Committee further noted,
"[h]ence, even if a settlement offer comes within an amount
previously authorized by the client, installment terms, non-cash
consideration, non-standard terms in a release, or other
unanticipated conditions may render the settlement offer
180
beyond the attorney's authority."
In addition to the specific authorization required for an
attorney to accept a settlement offer, ethical obligations bind the
attorney and prevent the attorney from "accepting any
181
settlement within the scope of the client's authorization."
Specifically, Rule 3-110(A) states that an attorney "shall not
intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal
services with competence." 182 "Competence" is defined under
Rule 3-110(B) as "to apply the 1) diligence, 2) learning and skill,
and 3) mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably

175. Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. Id. See e.g., Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 212 Cal. Rptr. 151, 159 (1985);
Alvarado Cmty. Hosp. v. Superior Court, Cal. Rptr. 52, 56 (1985).
180. Id.
181. Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167.
182. See id. quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-110 (2002).
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necessary for the performance of such service." 183 Hence,
Attorney A must decide whether to accept the offer as is or
whether to negotiate for a greater than two-thirds settlement184
In addition to her duty under Rule 3-110, Attorney A must
also satisfy her duties under Rule 3-500 and Business &
Professions Code section 6068(m). 185 These rules call for
Attorney A "to inform Client of significant developments
relating to the representation. " 186 Therefore, Attorney A must
"consider whether she should advise Client of changes
in the
law, business developments of which she' becomes aware,
information about the settlement practices of a defendant, or
other information about the strength or collectability of a claim
that might affect Client's authorization to Attorney A."187
The Committee concluded its discussion by articulating the
fiduciary relationship between attorneys and clients. 188

183. See id.
184. See Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167. "[Rlejecting the offer, or delaying
acceptance, might result in the offer being withdrawn entirely." Id. The Committee
further notes, "[tirying to negotiate a higher settlement might benefit Client beyond
any increased recovery. Accepting without negotiation every offer that is at or
above two-thirds of the claim might establish a reputation for Client among debtors
of never negotiating and prejudice Client's subsequent attempts to settle claims."

Id.
185. See id.
186. See id. Rule 3-500 provides:
A member shall keep a client reasonably informed about significant
developments relating to the employment or representation, including
promptly complying with reasonable requests for information and copies
of significant documents when necessary to keep the client so informed.
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3-500 (2002). CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 6068(m)
provides:
To respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of clients and to keep
clients reasonably informed of significant developments in matters with
regard to which the attorney has agreed to provide legal services.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(m) (2002).
187. Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167. The Committee posits the interplay of
Rule 3-510(A), "which requires an attorney promptly to communicate to her client
any written or significant offers of settlement." Id. at n.5. Clearly, compliance with
this rule is difficult when an attorney's client has disappeared.
Nevertheless, because the client's disappearance makes it impossible for
the lawyer to communicate with the client, the lawyer should exercise
independent professional judgment on behalf of the client. If in exercising
this judgment the lawyer concludes that no development takes the offer
outside her original authorization, the lawyer should accept the offer even
though she can not comply with the rule 3-510(A) communication
requirement.
Id. at n.5.
188. See Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167.
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According to the Committee, the fiduciary relationship is one in
which "the lawyer has a duty of undivided loyalty to his or her
client." 189 That being said, "in all situations where Attorney A
has discretion to accept or not accept settlement offers on behalf
of Client, her desire to be paid from the settlement proceeds
190
must not influence the exercise of that discretion."
The Committee held that under Rule 3-700 "an attorney
may withdraw if the client 'renders it unreasonably difficult for
the attorney to carry out the employment effectively' and that
191
absence of the client may be a sufficient basis to withdraw."
Therefore, under Rule 3-700, in situations in which "it
reasonably appears to the attorney that she cannot carry out her
instructions and fulfill her ethical obligations because of the
client's disappearance, the attorney would have an obligation to
try to find the client or to withdraw in compliance with rule 3700."192

b. May Attorney A Accept Attorney C's One-half Offer on
Behalf of Client?
The Committee quickly dismissed this issue in light of the
principles previously discussed. Therefore, "Attorney A cannot
accept any settlement offer at variance with her authority from
Client." 193 Nonetheless, the applicable statute of limitations
could create an issue. For instance, if the statute of limitations
were about to toll and Client was about to lose her claim
altogether, "it might appear that the duty of competence would
require Attorney A to accept the one-half offer to save some
recovery for Client." 94 The Committee, however, found this
189. Id. (citingZador Corp. v. Kwan, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 754, 762 (1995)).
190. Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167.

191. Id. (citing State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility and
Conduct, State Bar Formal Op. 1989-111 (1989)).
192. Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167. The Committee further notes, while
there are no definitive standards with regard to locating missing clients,
the attorney should consider the procedures discussed in State Bar Formal
Opinion Number 1989-111, including retention of a private investigator or
skip-tracing service, search of public records, use of registered or certified
mail with return receipt or address correction requested, and telephone
contact with the missing client's relatives or colleagues.
Id. The Internet is another tool recommended by the Committee to be used in
efforts to locate missing clients. See id.
193. See id. (citing Silver v. State Bar, 117 Cal. Rptr. 82, 92; Sampson v. State Bar
115 Cal. Rptr. 43, 55 (1974); Alvarado Cmty Hosp. v. Superior Court, 219 Cal. Rptr.
489, 493 (1985)).
194. Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167.

1528

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

perception ill-founded for two reasons: (1) "the client has not
given Attorney A authority to accept a one-half offer" 195 and (2)
"Attorney A is not authorized to determine independently what
is in Client's best interests from a substantive as opposed to a
procedural standpoint.196
Another issue the Committee raised is "whether the duty of
competence would allow Attorney A to reject the one-half offer,
but file a complaint to preserve Client's claim."'197 Under the
Committee's analysis, this conduct would not be proper.'98
"Although lawyers generally have authority to make tactical
decisions during litigation, for example, calling a particular
witness, they do not, merely by virtue of being retained by a
client, have authority to file suit." 199 If Attorney A were to file
suit on behalf of Client, she would be in violation of section
6104, which states "corruptly or willfully and without authority
appearing as attorney for a party to an action or proceeding
constitutes a cause for disbarment or suspension." 200
"Moreover, filing suit might be detrimental to Client and thus
constitute a violation of Attorney A's duty of competence." 201
c. May Attorney A Apply the Proceedsfrom Any
Settlement to Her Fees?
Under the hypothetical facts at issue, Client executed a
power of attorney expressly authorizing Attorney A "to endorse
Client's name to the settlement checks." 202 "If a proposed
settlement is in accord with Attorney A's authorization and the
fee agreement giving lawyer 25 percent of each claim collected is
enforceable, then she may endorse and deposit the settlement
check." 2 3 Therefore, "Attorney A... must deposit into trust the
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Id. (citingBlanton v. Womancare Inc., 212 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1985)).
200. Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167. However, "preparing a complaint for
filing in the event Client were found before the statute of limitations ran would not
be a violation of section 6104." Id. at n.7. This conduct does not constitute
"appearing" under section 6104, as opposed to filing a lawsuit,
which does
constitute "appearing as an attorney" under section 6104. See id.
201. Formal Op. 2002-160, supra note 167. "For example, Client might have had
reasons relating to finances, reputation, or other matters for instructing Attorney A
not to file suit. Preserving the claim is only one of the considerations." Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. The enforceability of the contingency fee arrangement depends upon its
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proceeds of the settlement - which represent both Client's
recovery on the claim and Attorney A's fee by virtue of the
that
contingency fee arrangement-and promptly withdraw
20 4
fee."
her
representing
funds
portion of the settlement
3.

Conclusion

In Formal Opinion 2002-160, the Committee raises thoughtprovoking issues confronted by attorneys when clients are
While the exact situation examined by the
unavailable.
Committee may not be confronted on a daily basis by attorneys
in general, the Committee's examination provides valuable
insight into the ethical considerations associated with
settlements and collecting legal fees stemming from settlements
facing attorneys when communication with clients is impossible.
IV. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA)
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)
The mission of updating the ABA MRPC was completed in
After five years of consideration and
February, 2002.205
negotiation, the ABA House of Delegates (House) completed the
20 6 "Many of the biggest
project with approximately an hour left.
battles over the ethics recommendations took place at last year's
ABA Annual Meeting in Chicago," and thus, the House focused
on only a few areas of controversy. 20 7 There was, however, one
20 8 "Under a plan
area intentionally reserved for another day.
supported by the Ethics 2000 Commission and the Commission
on Multijurisdictional Practice, the House agreed to defer
consideration of changes in the Model Rules that deal with
lawyers practicing law outside jurisdictions in which they are
Therefore, "[w]ith the adoption of the
admitted." 209
A.

compliance with Rule 4-200, "which provides a multi-factor balancing analysis to
determine whether a fee is 'illegal or unconscionable."' Id. at n.8. The Committee's
discussion presupposes the fee is enforceable. See id.
204. Id. "In collecting and accounting for the proceeds, Attorney A is governed
by rule 4-100, which provides that an attorney must deposit in one or more client
trust accounts all funds received or held for the benefit of a client." Id.
205. See generally Mark Hansen, Just in Time: Except for MIP, House Completes
Review of Proposed Ethics Changes, 88 A.B.A. J. 65 (2002).
206. See id.
207. Id. at 65.
208. See id.
209. Id.
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Commission's [Ethics 2000 Commission] recommendations by
the ABA House on February 5, 2002, the amendments to the
Model Rules became effective as ABA policy." 210
Later in 2002, the Commission on Multijurisdictional
Practice, after two years, twenty-five days, and nine public
hearings, completed its proposed revisions to the ABA MRPC
relating to multijurisdictional practice. 211 The House, in turn,
approved all of the recommendations made by the Commission
on Multijurisdictional Practice. 212 According to the new Model
Rules:
a lawyer licensed and in good standing in one state may
practice temporarily in another jurisdiction when the lawyer
is 1) performing nonlitigation work arising out of, or
reasonably related to, the lawyer's home-state practice; 2)
representing clients in arbitration or mediation proceedings;
3) providing litigation-related services in a state where he or
she is or expects to be admitted pro hac vice; or 4) working in
association with a lawyer licensed in the host state. 213
Additionally, motions to appear in other states are permitted by
attorneys seeking to practice in states where they are not
admitted to practice law. 214
The Commission on
Multijurisdictional Practice's recommendations
are also
consistent with the ABA's stance that "lawyers should be
regulated primarily at the state level."215 The recommendations
also include a provision which clarifies that, "under the Model
Rules, a state may discipline a lawyer who practices in the state
even if the lawyer is not licensed there." 216

210. Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 444 (2002). Love
also notes, "[o]f course, these rules are not binding on lawyers unless and until they
are adopted by the particular jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to
practice or, in some cases, is in fact practicing." Id.
211. See Mark Hansen, Smooth Sailing: House Approves Proposals to Ease MIP Rules
with Minimal Debate, 88 A.B.A. J. 69 (2002).
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. See id. Specified conditions must be met in order to be admitted without
taking that state's bar exam. See id. Also, foreign lawyers, under certain conditions,
.may practice temporarily in the United States." See
id.
215. Id.
216. Mark Hansen, Smooth Sailing: House Approves Proposals to Ease MJP Rules
with Minimal Debate, 88 A.B.A. J.69 (2002).
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21 7

Revisions, not Revolution
The ABA MRPC was not completely overhauled. Rather, it
was updated "in light of important developments since they
B.

were adopted in

1983."218

While the amendments "are by no

means radical," a great majority of jurisdictions - forty-four at
last count-model their codes, with some variation, after the
ABA MRPC. 220 Further, by mid-October, "43 states were at least
the revisions to determine which
in the early stages of reviewing
221
adopt."
changes, if any, to
There is some controversy as to whether the rules governing
lawyer ethics will be more uniform after the states have had an
2
opportunity to review the revisions. m "Some in the lawyer
regulation field see widespread state review of the revisions to
the Model Rules as an opportunity to achieve the uniformity in
professional conduct standards for lawyers that has been lacking
in recent years." 223 Others see the potential for "'both more and
less uniformity."' 224 The reason for less uniformity rests with the
notion that, "many states will consider adopting revisions in the
Model Rules that were recommended by the commission but
225 Apart from how the
rejected by the House of Delegates."
states respond to the revisions, at least one significant
be focused on the
advancement will occur: more lawyers will
226
form.
final
their
of
ethics rules, regardless
Following are some of the most significant topics addressed
under the ABA MRPC revisions.
219

217. See Nancy J. Moore, Revisions, Not Revolution: Targeting Lawyer/Client
Relations, Electronic Communications, Conflicts of Interests, 88 A.B.A.J. 48 (Dec. 2002).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See James Podgers, Lawyer Ethics in a State of Flux: Revisions in the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct May Soon Be Adopted in Your State, Get a Jump on
UnderstandingThem Now, 88 A.B.A.J. 46 (Dec. 2002).
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. Id. Robert A. Creamer, chair of an Illinois State Bar Association committee
that is reviewing the revisions to the ABA MRPC, states, "[tihe rules were always
thought to be local, ...[blut people have begun to acknowledge what we all knew
for a long time: Even in smaller firms, the practice of law is national." Id.
224. Id.
225. Podgers, supra note 220.
226. See id.
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Improving Communication with Clients227

It is all too common that clients complain about their
lawyers not communicating with them. 228 The revised ABA
MRPC now mandates "that lawyers put more of their
communications with clients in writing." 229 A newly created
Model Rule (MR) 1.0 defines "writing" and "confirmed in
writing." 230 Under MR 1.0, "writing" is defined as "a tangible or
electronic record of a communication or representation" and
"confirmed in writing" must take the form
"of a client's
informed consent to include a writing transmitted by the lawyer
to the client confirming a prior oral discussion."231
Model Rule 1.5 relates to attorneys' fees and was amended
to require that a lawyer's fee referral "be agreed to by the client,
including the share each lawyer will receive, and that the
agreement be confirmed in writing." 232 Similarly, MR 1.8 now
requires "a lawyer who enters into a business transaction with a
client to advise the client in writing of the desirability of seeking
the advice of independent counsel." 233 Additionally, under
revised MR 1.8, the client is also required to "give informed
consent in writing to both the essential terms of the transaction
and the lawyer's role in it, with particular reference to whether
the lawyer will be representing the client in the transaction." 234
2. Recognizing New Firm Structures235
The organization and structure of the practice of law is
changing and the revisions to the ABA MRPC respond to these
changes.236 A newly created rule, MR 2.4, requires a lawyer who
is acting as an arbitrator, mediator, or some other neutral thirdparty "to confirm to unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not
representing them." 237 Model Rule 1.12 has been amended to

227. See Moore, supra note 217.
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. See id.
231. Id. "A comment explains that if it is not feasible for the lawyer to obtain or
transmit the written confirmation when the client gives informed consent, the
lawyer must do so within a reasonable time after the client has given consent." Id.
232. Id.
233. Moore, supra note 217.
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
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"clarify that conflict-of-interest rules prohibiting former judges
and arbitrators from representing anyone in conjunction with a
matter in which they were previously involved in an
adjudicative capacity also should apply to lawyers who
238
previously served as mediators or other third-party neutrals."
Screening the lawyer who previously served as a mediator or
other third-party neutral to prevent disqualification of the whole
239
law firm is permissible under the amended rule.

The revisions, however, do not allow screening under all
circumstances. The House rejected a proposal that "would have
allowed a firm to continue to represent a client when a lawyer
for an adverse party joins the firm as long as the firm screens the
incoming lawyer from any participation in the matter and
240 While this
notifies the lawyer's form client of the screen."
proposal was rejected by the House, states may241 seriously
consider extending screening to additional situations.
242
3. Responding to Technology

Electronic mail is now included in the definition of a

"writing" under the ABA MRPC. 243 This is just one of the ABA's

responses to the ever-changing technological world in which we
The ABA responds to technological advances by
live.
addressing them in relation to the rules governing advertising
and solicitation. 244 Under MR 7.2, an attorney may now
advertise through "electronic communication, including public
media." 245 Model Rule 7.3 permits contacting a potential client
computerized telephone calls to
by email, but prohibits
246
clients.
prospective
Another area impacted by technology is the scope of MR 1.6
dealing with client confidential information. Model Rule 1.6 is a
hotly contested issue and is "[t]he rule with the greatest
variation" from state to state. 247 The Ethics 2000 Commission, in
an effort to align the ABA MRPC with the majority of states,
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
See Moore, supra note 217.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Moore, supra note 217.
See id.
Id.
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recommended revisions to MR 1.6 to "permit a lawyer to
disclose client confidences to prevent, rectify or mitigate
financial losses arising out of crimes or frauds of a client." 248 The
House, however, rejected the Ethics 2000 Commission's
recommendation and implemented its own amendment that
Hpermits a lawyer to reveal client information
to prevent
reasonably certain death or serious bodily harm even when such
harm is neither imminent nor the result of a client's crime." 249
V.

CONCLUSION

This past year has exemplified some of the shortcomings of
California's judicial system.
While the results of the
Commission's
five-year
study
are
daunting,
the
recommendations made by the Commission will undoubtedly
help to eradicate the plight of low-income families in their
efforts to obtain access to justice. California will, as it has done
many times in the past, respond to this issue and overcome it.
The State Bar of California Standing Committee on Professional
Responsibility and Conduct responded to pertinent ethical
issues in the three formal opinions it issued in 2002, providing
valuable insight to practicing attorneys on ethical issues likely to
arise in the course of their respective practices.
In addition, while the revisions to the ABA MRPC have
come to an end, it now remains to be seen how many states will
adopt the revised ABA MRPC, or at least sections of the revised
ABA MRPC. While many worthy revisions have been made to
the ABA MRPC, clearly not all the amendments will be adopted
by every state and the legal profession is far from resolving all of
its ethical issues.
The path California will choose is an
interesting and timely issue with proponents hoping for
substantial alignment with the revised ABA MRPC.250

248. Id.

249. Id.
250. See Bufford, supra note 6.

